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WILLIAM J. FARRELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE MENNEN COMPANY, a corporation, SMITH-FADS DRUG COMpANY, a corporation, ZIONS COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION, a corporation, WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY, a corporation, and JOHN DOE,
Defendants and Respondents.
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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WILLIAM J. FARRELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
THE MENNEN COMPANY, a corporation, SMITH-FAUS DRUG COMpANY, a corporation, ZIONS COOPERATIVE MERCANTILE IN. STITUTION, a corp~ration, WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY, a corporation, and JOHN DOE,
Defendants and

Case No.
7461

Respondent~.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a judgment (R. 9) of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, sustaining respondents' demurrer
(R. 7) to the complaint (R. 1-6) as failing to state facts
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sufficient to constitute a cause of action and dismissing the
complaint.
\

Respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Co., Zions Co-Operative
Mercantile Institution and Walgreen Drug Company, are
charged with infringment of an alleged trade name "Brace
For the Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair," by selling a
skin lotion under the mark "Skin Bracer." The complaint
is b~sed upon the annexed "Exhibit A," a certified copy of
a trade-mark registration (R. 6) issued to appellant on
August 31, 1925, by the Secretary of State of Utah. That
registration is for a complete label comprising the words
"BRACE FOR THE HAIR" over the phrase "A Real
Bracer For The Hair" in a distinctive design and with the
further legend "Alcohol 15%. Formulated and Produced by
WM. FARRELL, HAIR SPECIALIST, Salt Lake City, State
of Utah." The registration further states "Said Trade
Mark to be used generally as follows: A Real Bracer for the
hair.''
We do not agree with the-statement in appellant's brief
(pp. 6, 7) of the points and arguments presented in support
of the demurrer. Such statement was stricken from the
record by the District Court's order_ of February 25, 1950.
All points were fully argued and submitted in memoranda
below, and we do not agree with appellant's conclusion
(brief pp. 7-8) : "Naturally, neither party knows which of
the three arguments of respondents, if any, influenced the
Court when it sustained the demurrer."
It is perfectly clear to us why the Court sustained the
demurrer and appellant's contention to the contrary can
serve only to cloud the issues decided below.
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STATEMENT OF POINT
Respondents rely upon the following point for affirmance of the judgment appealed from:

The Complaint with annexed "Exhibit A"
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action.
1.

ARGUMENT

Appellant has not acquired exclusive rights in "Bracer."
Respondents' demurrer admits the facts well pleaded
but not, of course, their sufficiency. Here the facts pleaded
clearly show that appellant has acquired no rights to the
dictionary word "Bracer" by its use of the alleged trademark "Brace For The Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair,"
the only use alleged.
Appellant, throughout his brief, assumes his alleged
use of the word "bracer" constitutes a trade-mark use.
Such is not the fact under the allegations of his complaint.
Appellant's alleged trade-mark is not the word "bracer"
alone, as assumed in appellant's arguments, but is at the
very least the combination of words "A Real Bracer For.
The Hair." As the word "bracer" is used by appellant, in
that phrase, it is incapable of acquiring any trade-mark
significance. This proposition rests upon the obviously
sound principle that when a word is used, not in a trademark sense as the badge of the sponsor but only in a sense
which is laudatory advertising of the product, it cannot
become the exclusive mark of anyone who so uses it. We
cite a few of the leading authorities applying this principle.
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In Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett Peabody & Co.,
(CCPA) 127 F. 2d 318, at page 321, involving the slogan
"Handkerchief of the Year," the court stated:
"In the final analysis such expressions as we
are discussing with relation to objects of trade are
a 'puffing of wares' and are intended to call attention to the superiority of the advertised goods.
Such expressions are a condensed form of describing in detail the outstanding character or quality of
the objects to which they are applied * * *
"* * * We are further of opinion that the
notation inherently cannot function as a trade-mark.
Such a common expression which can indicate nothing but high quality surely would not be indicative
of origin to the purchasing public."
In Rosenberg v. Shakeproof (D. C., Del.), 20 F. Supp.
959, it was held that the word "Self-Tapping", as there
used by the plaintiff in its label, was incapable of acquiring
trade-mark significance. The label is reproduced at p. 963
and includes, as here, the na~e of the maker of the goods.
The court stated ( pp. 963-4) :
"The inconspicuous words 'hardened,' 'self-tapping,' and 'sheet metal screws' are descriptive of the
character, operation, and purpose of the product.
Plaintiff's advertising matter in evidence contains
many statements emphasizing the descriptive sense
in which the plaintiffs have been using the word
'self-tapping.' The way in which plaintiffs have
used the word 'self-tapping' precludes all possibility
that the word has come to indicate to anyone the
origin of the product. It is likewise established by
the evidence that the word 'self-tapping' has never
been used by the defendant in any other sense than
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in a descriptive sense. It is clear that the word
'self-tapping' cannot be appropriated by plaintiffs
as a valid trade-mark."
In the present case, the descriptive sense in which appellant has used the word "bracer" is "emphasized" in the
phrase "A Real Bracer For The Hair."
In Ex pa.rte American Enka Corp., a Commissioner's
Decision in June, 1949, 81 U. S. P. Q. 476, the facts were
stated as follows (p. 476) :
"The mark sought to be registered consists of a
vertical gray rectangle having a large black circle
superimposed upon the center thereof. Above the
circle appear the words 'THE FATE OF A FABRIC
HANGS BY A THREAD,' and below it appear the
words 'ENKA Rayon.' Within the circle appears
the words 'Fashion APPROVED.'"
The similarity to appellant's label and alleged trademark is apparent. In holding this mark, and particularly
the slogan, "THE FATE OF A FABRIC HANGS BY A
THREAD" incapable of trade-mark significance, the opinion states ( pp. 477-478) :
"The phrase 'THE FATE OF A FABRIC
HANGS BY A THREAD' as presented and used appears to me obviously to be an advertising phrase
indicating that the success or failure of a fabric depends upon the thread of which it is made and, as
associated with other features of the mark presented,
is clearly a laudatory or puffing expression indicating that the use of 'ENKA' thread in a fabric is desirable to insure against an unhappy fate. It would
appear that any function or identification in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

mark presented results from the use of the name
'ENKA' in the label, and that, unless used with that
word or with applicant's name, or otherwise associated with some other indication of a source or origin
of the thread, the phrase in question would not serve
as a means of identification of origin. As such it
would not appear to distinguish the goods of applicant from the goods of others, and whether or not
used in connection with 'ENKA' would simply stand ....
as, and be recognized as, a truism, perhaps aptly
stated, indicating the desirability that fabric be
composed of good thread. Alone it would not distinguish or identify any particular thread and would
seem merely an advertisement or advertising phrase
with reference to a potential use of thread, the
origin of which must be otherwise determined. While
not controlling and perhaps amounting to an oversimplification, it seems extremely doubtful that anyone would order or call for 'THE FATE OF A
FABRIC HANGS BY A THREAD' thread."

*

*

*

*

*

"While, as indicate.d above, it has never been
questioned but that a plurality of words might function as a trade mark, it must be noted that both
historically and by common understanding, overlong
phrases, sentences or clauses describing goods have
been regarded as advertisements rather than trade
marks. Somewhere between the few words ordinarily included in a trade mark and the number of words
included in a historical novel a line must be drawn.
Mer~ advertising language or features even if attached to ~oods or their containers, cannot be considered to be trade marks since they are or would
be just as applicable to the similar products of any
manufacturer and therefore cannot serve to identify
the goods of one person or distinguish from those of
others.·
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"Accepting, therefore, applicant's contention
that the question is not whether or not his mark is a
slogan, but whether or not it is a trade mark, it
must be found that the examiner was correct in
finding that words do not function as a trade mark
and cannot serve to indicate source or origin or
identify the goods of one applicant and distinguish
them from those of others."

Appellant's alleged use of "bracer" is merely in a laudatory phrase.
The function of a trade-mark is to indicate the origin
of goods, and not merely to state their function or puff
their merits. As stated by Nims in "Unfair Competition
and Trade-Marks," Vol. 1, at page 520:
"The important question of fact to be determined is whether the trade-mark name indicates the
producer, not whether it indicates the nature of the
goods. It may do both but it must, as its primary
function, indicate the producer."Since appellant has long used the word "bracer" in a
purely descriptive and laudatory sense, by combining it
with all the other words in the label, and at least with "A
Real Bracer For The Hair", he can not now prevent others
using the word "bracer" either to show that their hair
preparations have the same qualities for bracing the hair
or for any other purpose. It follows that any seller of skin
lotions is free to claim that his product is a "bracer" for
the skin so far as appellant is concerned. Such use of the
word "bracer" merely puffs the quality of his product and
has no significance as to origin in appellant. Therefore,
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respondents' use of "bracer" alone or with "skin" cannot
possibly confuse appellant's product with respondents' product.
We emphasize the respondents' position is based upon
the particular modus in which "bracer" is and has been for
25 years used by appellant, as part of the phrase "A Real
Bracer For The Hair," because appellant's arguments
ignore this point. In commenting on an exception to the
general r.ule that a word, generic or descriptive of the product, cannot be appropriated exclusively, appellant assumes
that his alleged trade-mark is simply the word "bracer" and
proceeds to cite authorities to show that such a word may
become a valid trade-mark when through long and exclusive
use as a trade name or mark it has acquired a secondary
meaning, indicating to the public the source of the product.
We do not dispute this exception to the general rule. Respondents did not below, and do not now contend that if'
appellant had used the word "bracer" by itself, in a trademark sense to denote the source rather than some claim of
functional merit of the product, it could not have acquired
a secondary meaning and thus become valid as a trade-mark
or trade-name. But appellant elected to use "bracer" in a
phrase and in such a manner that on the face of his alleged
trade-mark "A Real Bracer For The Hair" the word "bracer" has only a descriptive meaning. Therein lies the basic
distinction between the present case and those relied upon
by appellant.
It also is beside the point to contend, as appellant does,
that the word "bracer" has become obsolete in the sense of
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denoting a ''tonic" or "stimulant" 1 and is therefore, not
currently descriptive of appellant's hair preparation. Obviously, to characterize appellant's hair tonic as "A Real
Bracer For The Hair" makes use of the word "bracer"
descriptively, whether in the tonic or stimulant sense or in
the sense of that which "binds or makes firm," "strengthens,
steadies," which is equally applicable to a hair preparation
and is admittedly a current sense according to definitions
in appellant's brief (pp. 11-12). Appellant has chosen to
use this word in a descriptive sense, because otherwise his
advertising phrltse would have no meaning or would be
deceptive. Having regard to this manner in which "bracer"
appears as a part of appellant's alleged trade-mark, it is
curious to find appellant suggesting (Brief p. 13) that a
customer would be referred to the State Liquor Store if he
asked for a "bracer." It would seem more appropriate to
consider whether the floor walker would have directed the
customer to the liquor store if he had asked for "a real
bracer for the hair."
I

The L'Origan case is not in point.
Since appellant's brief makes repeated reference to
LeBlume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 Fed. 344, we point out
that in that case the trade-mark "L'Origan" had been used
by itself and not as part of a composite mark or laudatory
1

The following standard dictionaries show that the use of "bracer" in
this sense is not obsolete: Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 3rd Edition
of Merriam Series, 1929; Webster's Universities Dictionary, World
Publishing Co., 1940; The New Century DictiQnary, The Century Co.,
1929; Everyman's English Dictionary, E. P. Dutton, 1926; Macmillan's
Modern Dictionary, Macmillan Co., 1943; Wyld-Universal Dictionary
of English Language, G. Rautledge & Sons, 1932.
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phrase which showed on its face that the word "origan"
had only a descriptive meaning. The trade-mark owner had
used the word in a trade-mark sense, so that it was at least
capable of acquiring a secondary meaning, whether or not
it was obsolete. Moreover, it appeared that the trade-mark
owner had originated the te~ as applied in a trade-mark
sense to perfume. In distinguishing the case, the court in
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Compo Shoe Machinery
Corp., (C. C. P. A.), 56 F. 2d 292, stated (p. 294):
"The controlling facts of the case at bar are
very different from those in the case of LeBlume
Import Co. v. Coty (C. C. A.) 293 F. 344 (chiefly
relied upon by appellee), where the word 'Lorigan'
was held to be registerable as a trade-mark for
perfume. 'Lorigan' and 'Origan' meant the same.
'Origan' was the name of a rare plant. The principal base. of Coty's perfume was not the essence
from the origan plant, although it was claimed to
be the principal basis of other perfumes. The
court pointed out the equities of Coty who, unlike the appellee in the case at bar, was the originator of the term as applied to perfume, and also
called attention to the suggestive rather than descriptive character of the term, and applied the
doctrine of secondary meaning.

*

*

*

*

*

"One of appellee's witnesses claimed to have
'originated' the term 'Compo.' Upon this record it
can hardly be said that he 'originated' it; at most he
only brought it into more extensive use. If appellee's position in this case is correct, a manufacturer
of women's wearing apparel could 'originate' the
term 'bustle' and get a monopoly upon the term,
since bustles, as far as we know, are no longer used
and have not been in use nor have they been often
referred to in literature or conversation during the
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greater portion of the last half century. If appellee's contentions with respect to a trade-mark right
in the word which it claims to be obsolete were approved by the courts, the problems of the Patent
Office and the courts in determining what words
were 'obsolete and forgotten' would increase in frequency and perplexity. A trade-mark, as was held
by the United States Supreme Court in Bourjois
& Co. v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689, 692, 43 S. Ct. 244, 67
L. Ed. 464, 26 A. L. R. 567, carries with it a monopoly, as far as it goes, no less complete than does
a patent. Such monopolistic rights must rest on
foundations more secure than those upon which appellee relies."
In sum, appellant does not allege that "Bracer" is
original with him, or even a trade-mark use of that. wellknown word.

Registration created no substantive rights in appellant.
Apparently ~ppellant does not now contend that his
registration in 1925 under the statute quoted (brief p. 27)
was more than a mere "record" of "his claim," as stated in
the Utah statutes to the present time. His reliance on the
statutes is merely for constructive notice of that purported
claim.
It is the universal rule that registration statutes are
merely in affirmance of the common law and do not create
or confer any substantive rights in trade-marks registered
thereunder, see generally, 52 American Jurisprudence, Sec.
44, p. 534, and 63 Corpus Juris, Sec. 142, p. 470, Trade.tlark Cases 100 U. S. 82, and Armstrong Paint & Varnish
Works vs. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315.
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"Skin Bracer" or "Bracer" on skin lotion is not an infringement of appellant's compoBite mark.
Assuming, however erroneously, that "Brace For The
Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair" is capable of being or
becoming a valid trade-mark for hair tonic, it is clearly not
infringed by respondents' use of "bracer" alone or with
the word "skin" for the well-known and long-established
Mennen product.
As pointed out by Nims In "Unfair Competition and
Trade-Marks, (4th Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 361:
"The cardinal rule upon the subject is that no
one shall, by imitation or any unfair device, induce
the public to believe that the goods he offers for
sale are the goods of another and thereby appropriate. to himself the value of the reputation which the
other has acquired for his own products or merchan. .
dise."
There follows a collection of representative cases where
infringement of various labels, slogans and trade. .marks was
decided. In none was relief granted where there was as
little likelihood of confusion as is here the case, and in many
where the respective marks were much closer was relief
denied.
Respondents use only "bracer," one of the ten words
in appellant's composite mark or phrase. Could the public
possibly be "induced" thereby to believe that Mennen's
"Skin Bracer" was the product of William Farrell-Hair
·Specialist? A member of the public in Utah, buying the
widely-known "Skin Bracer" lotion, even if he had great
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familiarity with only part of appellant's phrase "A Real
Bracer For The Hair," would not associate the lotion of
Mennen with the tonic of Farrell or with Farrell himself.
Something more than the one common word "bracer" would
be necessary for such association. If appellant wanted the
public, via his phrase, to associate a skin lotion with him or
his tonic, he would undoubtedly use the full phrase, substituting "skin" for "hair." The mere use of "bracer"
would obviously not be enough to insure this desired public
association.
Actually "Skin Bracer'' and "Brace For The Hair, A
Real Bracer For The Hair" are so different in sound, meaning and appearance there is no infringement of one by the
other.

Even if appellant had been right as to validity and infringement the Complaint is still fatally defective.
It is interesting to note that, while the complaint, para.
7 (R. 3), alleges that "Skin Bracer" has been used by Mennen and by respondents "for sometime last past," it fails to
allege that appellant adopted or used his alleged trade-mark
prior to respondents or to Mennen. This seems a fatal omission to a cause of action for trade-mark infringement and
for the injunctive relief prayed for by appellant (R. 4) because priority of adoption and use is necessary to appellant's affirmative case. Under the statute, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Sec. 95-1-6, it is the "person who has first
adopted and used a trade-mark, trade-name or device" who
is the "owner" and entitled to an injunction and damages
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for its infringement. The same is true at common law, Nims
(supra). Sec. 217, pp. 628-9.

The District Court did not err in entering the judgment
from which appellant appeals.
Appellant as an afterthought, (brief pp. 29-30), contends that because the District Court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction over The Mennen Company and an unidentified
other party defendant, John Doe, it should not have dismissed the complaint as to them, but only as to the three
respondents w~o alone demurred.
This seems extremely technical when it is considered
that appellant elected to stand on his complaint because he
has alleged all facts that he can prove, (brief p. 8), and the
complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action against The Mennen Company and the unidentified defendant for the same reasons that it was held insufficient by the Court below as against the respondents.
One attempted service on The Mennen Compa·ny in New
Jersey has already ~een vacated below on Mennen's motion
because as stated by appellant, (brief p. 29), the District
Court had no jurisdiction over The Mennen Company and
John Doe. What useful purpose could be accomplished by
appellant hereafter obtaining a valid service on defendants
over which the Court now has no jurisdiction, if the complaint upon which service is issued alleges all that can be
proved but does not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against such defendants.
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We submit, however, that the judgment entered by the
District Court, in substance and legal effect, dismisses this
action as to the respondents only. If, in view of appellant's
contentions there should be any doubt in this respect, this
Court, of course, may clarify the legal effect of the District
Court's judgment by a simple modification thereof to the
effect that the action herein is dismissed only as to the
respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Company, Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institution and Walgreen Drug Company,
and as so modified, affirm the same.
CONCLUSION
So it appears that the District Court had clear reason
to sustain the demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.
It could serve no useful purpose to put respondents to the
trouble and expense of trial on such a complaint.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with
costs to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Respondents·.
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
DAVIS, HOXIE & F AITHFULL,
Of Counsel
20 Pine Street
New York, New York
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